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Abstract: The standard account of supererogation holds that Liv is not 
morally required to jump on a grenade, thereby sacrificing her life, to save 
the lives of five soldiers.  Many proponents defend the standard account 
by appealing to moral rationalism about requirement.  These same 
proponents hold that Bernie is morally permitted to jump on a grenade, 
thereby sacrificing his life, to spare someone a mild burn.  I argue that this 
position is unstable, at least as moral rationalism is ordinarily defended.  
The proponent of the standard account of supererogation must either 
reject moral rationalism or endorse that Bernie is morally required to 
remain in safety.  Along the way, this paper brings together three 
neglected topics: going *too far* beyond the call of duty, moral 
rationalism about *permission*, and how to weigh reasons when some 
reasons have a different proportion of justifying and requiring weight than 




 Supererogation involves going beyond the call of (moral) duty in a morally good way.  
Such acts are morally optional, i.e. permissible but not required.  Yet not just any morally 
optional act is supererogatory.  It has to be in some sense morally better than some other 
permissible option.  For example: 
Five Lives: Liv realizes that an enemy grenade will kill five of her fellow soldiers 
if she remains in safety.  She can save the five soldiers by jumping on the 
grenade, thereby sacrificing her own life.  Or she can remain in safety and allow 
the fellow soldiers to die. 
Liv’s jumping on the grenade would constitute a paradigmatic instance of supererogation.  
It is morally optional for Liv to jump on the grenade, and it is morally better if she does. 
 Otherist accounts of morality hold that there is an asymmetry between an agent’s 
interests and the interests of the other, i.e., the members of the moral community who 
aren’t the agent: while altruistic reasons are moral reasons, self-interested reasons are 
not.1  This picture explains how Liv’s jumping on the grenade is morally better, for Liv’s 
self-interested reason to remain in safety is a non-moral reason.  This is a genuine 
achievement.  Otherism’s most prominent rival is impartialism, the view that the interests 
of all members of the moral community—including the agent—are equal moral reasons.  
Even if Liv had to choose between her life and that of a single fellow soldier, it would be 
morally better for her to sacrifice her life.  Yet if Liv’s self-interest is a moral reason in 
exactly the same way as that of a fellow soldier, then how it could be morally better to 
sacrifice?  Impartialists must make some concession to otherism if they wish to capture 
 
1 Portmore endorses what I call ‘otherism’ in his 2011: 96 (including nt 39), 128-9.   
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the idea that, other things being equal, altruism is morally better than self-interested 
action. 
 On the other hand, otherists must make concessions of their own.  If Liv’s self-interest 
isn’t a moral reason, then how can it make it morally permissible to remain in safety?  
How can the otherist make sense of the sacrifice’s being a moral option rather than a 
moral requirement? 
 The standard otherist account of optionality holds that Liv’s self-interested reason is 
a non-moral reason which is nonetheless morally relevant.  It is relevant insofar as it has 
moral justifying weight that outweighs the pro tanto requirement to save the five lives.  If 
the self-interested reason did have moral requiring weight, then the standard otherist view 
is that it would be a moral reason after all (e.g., Portmore 2011: 128).  Hence, the account 
further contends that the self-interested reason cannot have moral requiring weight.  I 
challenge this further contention. 
 While we can go beyond the call of duty in a morally good way, we can also go too 
far beyond the call of duty.  Consider: 
Mild Burn: Bernie realizes that an enemy grenade will mildly burn one of his 
fellow soldiers if he remains in safety.  He can spare the soldier the mild burn 
by jumping on the grenade, thereby sacrificing his own life.  Or he can remain 
in safety and allow the fellow soldier to be mildly burned. 
My view is that Bernie is morally required to remain in safety.  To account for the moral 
requirement against pursuing this mild altruistic benefit, I hold that the (allegedly non-
moral) self-interested reason has moral requiring weight. 
 The otherist may protest. “If Bernie jumps on the grenade, he makes a mistake from 
the perspective of rationality but not morality.  He is, in fact, morally permitted to jump 
on the grenade.”2  As an impartialist sympathizer, I find this protest hard to swallow.  
Bernie is one person among many; his wellbeing matters to morality just like that of any 
other person; his humanity deserves just as much respect as everyone else’s; and so forth.  
Yet these tropes won’t convince the otherist.  Indeed, the otherist can deny that Bernie is 
morally required to remain in safety…but only at cost.  
 Moral rationalism about requirement is the thesis that moral requirements are rational 
requirements.  Many otherists endorse such moral rationalism and use it to motivate their 
standard account of optionality.3  My goal is to force these otherists into choosing 
between: (a) giving Bernie’s wellbeing moral requiring weight and thereby granting that 
Bernie is morally required to remain in safety or (b) reject the moral rationalism that many 
otherists use to motivate their account of optionality.   
 In §1, I briefly review Gert’s justifying/requiring distinction.  In §2, I present the 
standard otherist account of supererogation, as it is developed by Portmore (2008; 2011: 
ch 5).4  Portmore’s version is influential,5 and it is the clearest about how to weigh the 
altruistic moral reasons against the self-interested non-moral reasons.  In §3, I present the 
parallel reasoning that commits Portmore to holding that Bernie is morally required to 
 
2 Those who would make such an objection include Curtis (1981: 314), Gert (2014), and maybe Portmore 
(2011: ch 5, especially pg 139). 
3 Many, not all.  Gert (2014) is an otherist who rejects moral rationalism.  While I reject moral rationalism, 
I am sympathetic with Portmore’s (2014) reply to Gert’s brand of anti-rationalism. 
4 Similar accounts are given by Clark (1978), Curtis (1981), and Muñoz (forthcoming).  
5 For example, it is assumed by both Massoud (2016) and Archer (2016). 
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remain in safety.  This parallel reasoning depends on two moves.  The first is extending 
moral rationalism about requirement to moral rationalism about permission, i.e., moral 
permissions are rational permissions.  I defend this extension in §4.  The second move 
concerns how to weigh reasons to determine an overall deontic verdict.  I defend the 
second move in §5.  In §6, I deny Portmore’s last chance to break the parallel between 
his argument and the extension. 
 This paper brings together three neglected topics.  First, there is little sustained 
reflection on how to understand going too far beyond the call of duty or how it relates to 
existing normative theories.  Second, while there is a rich debate concerning the merits 
of moral rationalism about requirement, there is little discussion of moral rationalism 
about permission or whether one can coherently endorse one kind of rationalism and 
reject the other.   
 The third neglected topic is how to weigh the reasons needed to account for 
supererogation.  A natural model of weighing reasons is a single scale on which the 
reasons for φ go in one pan and the reasons for ~φ go on the other.  It assumes that as a 
reason has justifying weight (as it pushes φ down toward permissibility), it also has 
requiring weight (it pushes ~φ up toward impermissibility).  This assumption is 
incompatible with the standard otherist account of supererogation, which holds that self-
interested reasons are merely justifying (have justifying but not requiring weight).  Merely 
justifying reasons push φ toward permissibility without pushing ~φ toward 
impermissibility.  What sort of model do we use to weigh merely justifying reasons?  
 
1. Justifying vs Requiring, Requirements, and Moral Options 
 A consideration has justifying weight for φ (JWφ) iff the consideration makes φ 
permissible in the absence of sufficiently weighty countervailing considerations.  I can 
accept or decline some surgery for my child.  That the surgery will cause my child pain 
for weeks has justifying weight for declining: in the absence of sufficiently weighty 
countervailing considerations, it is permissible to decline the surgery.   
 A consideration has requiring weight for φ (RWφ) iff it makes the alternative, ~φ, 
impermissible in the absence of sufficiently weighty countervailing considerations.  That 
the surgery will cause my child pain for weeks also has requiring weight for declining: in 
the absence of sufficiently weighty countervailing considerations, it is impermissible to 
accept the surgery.   
 A requirement to φ is a compound deontic verdict: φ is a requirement iff φ is 
permissible and ~φ is impermissible.6  Justifying and requiring weight work together to 
make one required to φ.  When the pain’s justifying weight makes it permissible to decline 
the surgery and its requiring weight makes it impermissible to accept it (so there are no 
sufficiently weighty countervailing considerations), the pain requires me to decline the 
surgery.  On the other hand, if the benefits of the surgery outweigh the pain’s justifying 
and requiring weight, then I’m not (all-in) required to decline the surgery.  I am only pro 
tanto required to decline the surgery, i.e., required in the absence of sufficiently weighty 
countervailing considerations. 
 
6 Here I follow Portmore (2011: 88-9) and Dorsey (2016: 166). I also assume that we always have exactly 




 When reasons have more justifying than requiring weight, they have some tendency 
to make actions permissible without making them required.  Such reasons are useful 
when, like Portmore, you are trying to explain moral options, cases in which both φ and 
~φ are permissible. 
 
2. Making Sense of Going Beyond the Call of Duty: Optionality 
 In this section, I present Portmore’s otherist account of how it is morally optional for 
Liv to jump on the grenade.  The upshot is that Liv’s self-interested non-moral reason 
must have moral justifying weight. 
 In a nutshell, the account is this.  The lives of the five other people pro tanto—but not 
all-in—require Liv to jump on the grenade.  Consequently, there must be some reason to 
remain in safety with at least as much justifying weight for remaining in safety as there 
is requiring weight to jump.  The only candidate for having justifying weight to remain 
in safety is Liv’s self-interested reason, so self-interested reasons have moral justifying 
weight.  More formally: 
1. The prevention of five deaths is a reason to jump on the grenade that has moral 
requiring (and justifying) weight, and thus Liv is morally required to jump on the 
grenade in the absence of countervailing reasons.7 
2. Liv is not (all-in) morally required to jump on the grenade and is permitted to 
remain in safety. 
3. If an agent has some moral requiring reason, MRR, for φ but is permitted to ~φ 
(and so is not all-in required to φ), then there is a reason with at least as much 
justifying weight for ~φ as MRR has moral requiring weight for φ.8 
4. In Five Lives, Liv’s self-interested reason is the only candidate for having 
justifying weight for remaining in safety. 
5. Therefore, the self-interested reason has moral justifying weight for not jumping 
on the grenade that is at least as weighty as the moral requiring weight of the five 
lives. 
 1 is very plausible.  There is general agreement that we are pro tanto morally required 
to prevent the death of others and, per §1, both justifying and requiring weight work 
together to explain (pro tanto) moral requirements. 
 2 is debatable.  For example, Dorsey (2016: chs 3, 4) argues that Liv is (all-in) morally 
required to save the five lives.  Dorsey and Portmore do agree, however, with the near 
undeniable claim that (2′) Liv is not (all-in) rationally required to jump on the grenade, 
where rationality is the unique practical perspective that has final authority over what to 
do.9   
 Portmore and Dorsey part ways precisely because they disagree about whether 
morality’s requirements are “rationally authoritative” (Portmore 2011: 4).  In other words, 
they disagree over moral rationalism about requirements (MRREQ), i.e., the claim that 
φ is morally required only if it is rationally required.  Dorsey denies MRREQ and Portmore 
 
7 Portmore defends 1 in his 2008: 373-5. 
8 For Portmore’s defense of 3, see his 2008: 375, 2011: 127. 
9 Sobel (2007b: 14-16) likely joins Dorsey in endorsing 2′ but rejecting 2.  And so would anyone else who 
takes the demandingness objection to consequentialism to reveal, not that consequentialism is a false moral 
theory, but that morality lacks final authority over how we are to live.  
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endorses it.  Since Liv is not rationally required to jump on the grenade, given MRREQ, it 
follows that she isn’t morally required either (2008: 377, nt 15; 2011:130, nt 15). 
 3 is very plausible, and the model of weighing reasons in §5 will confirm it. 
 Portmore assumes that 4 is true.  As Five Lives was described, Liv has at least two 
reasons, namely the altruistic reason (the lives of the five soldiers) and Liv’s self-
interested reason (her life).  Portmore tells us to “Assume that these are the only morally 
relevant facts” (2011: 126).  We’ll revisit the assumption in §6, but for now let’s play 
along and screen off any other morally relevant considerations.  Once we do, Liv’s self-
interested reason is the only candidate for having the requisite justifying weight to prevent 
Liv’s pro tanto requirement from being an all-in requirement. 
 The picture that emerges from Portmore’s 1-5 provides an explanation of how 
jumping on the grenade can be morally optional.  Our self-interested reasons have enough 
justifying weight to prevent jumping on the grenade from being morally required, despite 
its being morally better to do so.10  If Liv jumps on the grenade, she really does go beyond 
the call of duty. 
 
3. Making Sense of Going Too Far Beyond the Call of Duty 
 This section argues that, if Portmore’s strategy shows that self-interested reasons have 
moral justifying weight, then it can be extended to show that self-interested reasons have 
moral requiring weight.  One can’t endorse Portmore’s account and then deny that Bernie 
is morally required to remain in safety.   
 In a nutshell, the account is this.  We are pro tanto justified in taking the necessary 
means of preventing others from suffering mild harms.  Hence, the mild burn pro tanto 
justifies Bernie to jump on the grenade.  But it doesn’t all-in justify it.  Perhaps one can 
permissibly sacrifice their life to secure some altruistic benefits that fall short of saving a 
life.  For example, perhaps Bernie could sacrifice his life to prevent someone’s paralysis.  
Yet one can’t permissibly sacrifice their worthwhile life to prevent a mild burn.11  
Consequently, there must be some reason to remain in safety with at least as much 
requiring weight for remaining in safety as there is justifying weight to jump.  The only 
candidate is Bernie’s self-interested reason, so self-interested reasons have moral 
requiring weight.  More formally: 
1*. The prevention of the mild burn is a reason to jump on the grenade that has 
moral justifying weight, and thus Bernie is morally permitted to jump on the 
grenade in the absence of countervailing reasons. 
2*. Bernie is not (all-in) morally permitted to jump on the grenade.12 
 
10 On Portmore’s view, moral betterness involves a third dimension of reasons, favoring.  The altruistic act 
is morally better than the self-interested act, because requiring reasons (like the altruistic prevention of 
death) have favoring strength and merely justifying reasons (like self-interested reasons are on his view) 
do not have favoring strength (2019: 188, nt 4; cf. 2011: 122-4, including nts 6-7, and 128).  My view of 
moral betterness also involves a third role of reasons (see my manuscript). 
11 Where do you draw the line for how much self-sacrifice is permissible?  The model in §5 answers: you 
are permitted to self-sacrifice until the requiring weight for the self-interested action > the justifying weight 
for the self-sacrificial action.  Portmore can’t complain about this answer because we can always ask him, 
where do we draw the line for how much self-interested action is permitted?  His answer, also given by the 
model in §5, is that you are permitted to act self-interestedly until the justifying weight for the self-
interested action is < the requiring weight for the self-sacrificial alternative. 
12 Stangl (2016, especially 355) endorses 2*, and Clark (1978: 32) is at least sympathetic.  
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3*. If an agent has a moral justifying reason, MJR, for φ but is not all-in morally 
permitted to φ, then there is a reason with more moral requiring weight for ~φ 
than MJR has justifying weight for φ.13 
4*. In Mild Burn, Bernie’s self-interested reason is the only candidate for having 
requiring weight for remaining in safety. 
5*. Therefore, the self-interested reason has moral requiring weight that is 
weightier than the moral justifying weight of the mild burn. 
 1* is just as plausible as 1.  Just as we are pro tanto required to prevent the deaths of 
five people, we are pro tanto justified in preventing small harms to others. 
 2* will be a no brainer for those who, like Dorsey (2016, ch 3), endorse impartialism 
about morality.  For impartialism holds that the agent’s wellbeing has the same moral 
weight as everyone else’s. 
 Portmore endorses the otherist conception of morality, so he cannot accept the 
impartialist rationale for 2*.  Yet consider (2*′): Bernie is not (all-in) rationally permitted 
to jump on the grenade.  This claim seems near undeniable.  Jumping on the grenade in 
such circumstances would display “recklessness” (Massoud 2016: 706) or “foolishness” 
(Stangl 2016: 355).  Bernie would have “decisive reason” not to jump on the grenade 
(Portmore 2011: 4).14   
 2*′ gives us 2 as long as we accept moral rationalism about permission (MRPERM), 
i.e., φ is morally permitted only if it is rationally permitted.  MRREQ justified the inference 
from 2′ (Liv is not rationally required to sacrifice) to 2 (Liv is not morally required to 
sacrifice).  Likewise, MRPERM justifies the inference from 2*′ (Bernie is not rationally 
permitted to sacrifice) to 2* (Bernie is not morally permitted to sacrifice).  In the next 
section, I argue that Portmore’s defense of moral rationalism about requirement can be 
extended to an equally plausible defense of moral rationalism about permission.  So 2 and 
2* stand or fall together. 
 In §5, I defend the move from 3 to 3*, as well as defend a general model of weighing 
reasons. 
 For now, we are just assuming that 4* is true.  As Mild Burn was described, Bernie 
has at least two reasons, namely the altruistic reason (preventing the mild burn) and 
Bernie’s self-interested reason (his life).  Portmore tells us to “Assume that these are the 
only morally relevant facts” (2011: 126).  We’ll revisit this assumption in §6, but for now 
screen off any other morally relevant considerations.  Once we do, Bernie’s self-
interested reason is the only candidate for having requiring weight for remaining in safety. 
 The picture that emerges from 1*-5* explains how one can go too far beyond the call 
of moral duty.  Bernie’s self-interested reasons have enough moral requiring weight to 
prevent jumping on the grenade from being morally permitted, despite the altruistic 
benefit.  If Bernie jumps on the grenade, he makes a moral mistake, not just a rational 
one.  He goes too far beyond the call of duty. 
 Premise 1* of my extension seems straightforward.  The rest of the paper defends 2* 
3*, and 4*.  The ultimate payoff is that the otherist must either (i) grant that Bernie’s self-
 
13 Massoud (2016: 706) rejects 3*.  She mistakenly assumes that if the justifying weight of remaining in 
safety is great enough it will defeat the pro tanto permission to jump on the grenade.  Yet justifying weight 
is not in the business of making anything impermissible no matter how much of it you have.  Only requiring 
weight does that. 
14 Also see Curtis 1981: 314 and Clark 1978: 32. 
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interest has moral requiring weight and thus Bernie is morally required to remain in 
safety, or (ii) reject the moral rationalism that motivates the standard otherist account of 
supererogation’s optionality. 
 
4. Defending the Extension to 2*: Moral Blameworthiness and Rationality 
 Portmore’s second premise, 2, is that Liv is morally permitted to remain in safety.  To 
defend 2, he appeals to moral rationalism about requirement (MRREQ).  The extension’s 
second premise, 2*, is that Bernie is morally required to remain in safety.  To defend 2*, 
the extension appeals to moral rationalism about permission (MRPERM).  I argue that the 
best argument for moral rationalism about requirement can be extended into an equally 
good (or, as I prefer to think of it, equally bad) argument for moral rationalism about 
permission.  Thus, Portmore’s defense of Liv’s moral permission commits him to Bernie’s 
moral requirement. 
 
4.1. Portmore’s Argument for Moral Rationalism about Requirement 
 Portmore (2011; cf. Harman 2016) endorses moral rationalism about requirement but 
denies moral rationalism about permission.  This position is unstable, at least when one 
defends the former moral rationalism by appealing to a connection with blameworthiness.  
This is what Portmore and many others do.15  Here is the main argument: 
The Blameworthiness and Requirement Argument  
A. If S is morally required to ~φ, then S would be morally blameworthy for freely 
and knowledgeably φ-ing.16 
B. S would be morally blameworthy for freely and knowledgeably φ-ing only if 
S is rationally required to ~φ.17 
C. Therefore, if S is morally required to ~φ, then S is rationally required to ~φ.18 
 A links moral requirements with moral blameworthiness. B links moral 
blameworthiness with rational requirements.  Together A and B give us C, which is just 
moral rationalism about requirement, the idea that moral requirements are also rational 
requirements.  Before I present the parallel argument for moral rationalism about 
permission, it will be useful to first explain why this argument is so unsuccessful. 
 Moral rationalists, including Portmore, recognize that there is a conceptual distinction 
between morality and rationality, where only the latter is defined as having final authority 
over what to do.  Of course, distinct concepts need not entail distinct referents.  ‘Biden’ 
is conceptually distinct from ‘the President of the US’ even though Biden is (identical to) 
the President of the US.  Likewise, perhaps some or all of morality’s deontic verdicts 
(e.g., its verdicts of required and permissible) have final authority even though they do 
 
15 See, for example, Portmore (2008, 2011: 43-4), Darwall (2006: ch. 5; 2016), and Murphy (2017: 26).  I 
focus on Portmore’s 2011 presentation of this argument, but he provides the same argument in his 2021: 
54-56. 
16 This premise is especially popular.  J. S. Mill provides the classic statement of it.  In addition to those 
who explicitly endorse the whole argument, contemporary support for this premise includes Gibbard (1990: 
40-45) and Skorupski (1999: ch 7). 
17 Darwall (2016: 269) takes this premise to be conceptually true.  Portmore (2011: 44) initially claimed 
that it was not a conceptual truth, but he seems to have changed his mind (2014: 241).  Sobel (2007b) rejects 
moral rationalism, but even he admits that B is plausible (2007a: 155-6). 
18 The standard presentations of this argument replace ‘is rationally required to ~φ’ with ‘does not have 
sufficient reason to φ’.  This amounts to the same thing, as Portmore (2011: 42-3) makes clear.  
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not have such authority by definition.  The conceptual distinction is nonetheless 
important.  It shows us that we need an argument to insist that certain verdicts of morality 
have final authority (e.g., moral requirements are also rational requirements). 
 Yet once we make the conceptual distinction between morality and rationality, we 
must distinguish between moral blameworthiness and rational blameworthiness.  The 
former is blameworthiness from the moral perspective and the latter is blameworthiness 
from the rational perspective.  Again, distinct concepts need not entail distinct referents.  
It may be that there is just one kind of blameworthiness and that moral and rational 
blameworthiness are identical.  The conceptual distinction is nonetheless important.  It 
shows us that we need an argument to insist that blameworthiness from the moral 
perspective is or entails blameworthiness from the rational perspective. 
 The literature on moral rationalism tends to assume that there is just one kind of 
blameworthiness and it is moral blameworthiness.19  You’ll notice that the argument for 
moral rationalism about requirement is stated in terms of moral blameworthiness.20  This 
is why A is arguably a conceptual truth, as Portmore (2011: 44) and Darwall (2016: 269) 
contend.  You might think that a coherent practical perspective is going to blame you just 
in case you freely and knowledgably make a mistake from that perspective.  If you don’t 
do what you are morally required to do, then you are making a moral mistake.  When you 
freely and knowingly make such a mistake, it is your fault that you made such a mistake 
and thus morality blames you for it.  So, A is plausibly (conceptually) true. 
 Yet B is not a conceptual truth.  B holds that blameworthiness from the moral 
perspective entails a rational mistake (violating a rational requirement).  We need some 
argument to justify linking moral blameworthiness to rationality in this way.  To avoid 
begging the question, this argument should not itself assume that moral blameworthiness 
just is rational blameworthiness. 
 Portmore does provide an argument for B, but the argument itself assumes that moral 
blameworthiness is rational blameworthiness.  It begins by claiming that: 
B1. S is morally blameworthy for some action only if S has the capacity to 
respond to both moral and non-moral reasons.21  
B1 says that responsiveness to both moral and non-moral reasons “opens the door” to 
assessments of moral blameworthiness (2011: 48).  Such responsiveness is, in other 
words, what makes an agent’s actions eligible to be assessed for moral blameworthiness 
(and moral praiseworthiness). 
 Portmore remarks, “Surely, it cannot be that the very capacity that opens the door to 
an agent’s being blameworthy is the one that leads her to perform blameworthy acts” 
(48).  In other words:  
B2. If B1, then S can’t be morally blameworthy for flawlessly responding to both 
moral and non-moral reasons. [cf. Portmore’s 2.19, 2011: 48] 
The conjunction of B1 and B2 entails: 
 
19 It isn’t just the literature on moral rationalism.  See, for example, Tognazzini and Coates’ SEP entry on 
blame. 
20 Portmore explicitly says he has in mind moral blameworthiness (2011: 43).  Dorsey’s (2016: 56-7) 
objection to the Blameworthiness and Requirement Argument seems to assume that there is just one kind 
of blameworthiness, but he insists that it is rational blameworthiness. 
21 B1 is a simplified version of Portmore’s 2.17 (2011: 48).  2.17 doesn’t specify that both moral and non-
moral reasons are needed, but 2.16 does. 
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B3. Therefore, S can’t be morally blameworthy for flawlessly responding to both 
moral and non-moral reasons.22 
If B3 is true, then B arguably follows.23  Nonetheless, this argument for B is a complete 
failure. 
 An initial problem is the ambiguity that runs through B1-B3.  Start with B1.  Does it 
claim that moral blameworthiness requires the capacity to respond to some or all non-
moral reasons?  It is plausible that moral blameworthiness requires the capacity to 
respond to some moral reasons, such as epistemic reasons.  If you aren’t capable of 
responding to epistemic reasons about what your moral reasons are, it isn’t clear that you 
can be capable of responding to your moral reasons at all.  Yet moral blameworthiness 
doesn’t require the capacity to respond to every non-moral reason.  Why would moral 
blameworthiness about any arbitrary φ require the capacity to respond to, say, aesthetic 
reasons?   
 The mere fact that moral blameworthiness requires the capacity to respond to some 
non-moral reason or another is useless in this context.  Portmore needs to block the claim 
that self-interested reasons can make it rationally permissible to act against your moral 
requirements.  Hence, Portmore needs B1 to entail that moral blameworthiness requires, 
more specifically, the capacity to respond to self-interested moral reasons.  We should 
understand all of B1-B3 in like manner.  For example, B3 should be interpreted to entail 
that S can’t be morally blameworthy for flawlessly responding to both moral and self-
interested reasons. 
 Now that we’ve clarified the ambiguity, we can see that the premises aren’t plausible 
unless we assume that moral blameworthiness is rational blameworthiness.  Regarding 
B1, we have no reason to suppose that moral blameworthiness requires the capacity to 
respond specifically to self-interested reasons.  Suppose that there were moral weirdos, 
creatures capable of responding to moral reasons but incapable of responding to self-
interested reasons.24  I submit that such a creature could be morally blameworthy if it 
freely and knowingly acted against his decisive moral reasons.  For example, the creature 
might be morally blameworthy for murdering his rich neighbor to benefit his relatively 
poor neighbor.  If we are really concerned with moral blameworthiness and are not 
assuming that moral blameworthiness just is rational blameworthiness, it is hard to see 
why the capacity to respond to self-interested reasons is required to be morally 
blameworthy.  And so B1 is in doubt. 
 B2 suffers from a similar problem.  Suppose that morality cares only about some—
not all—reasons that rationality cares about.  That is, suppose that morality’s deontic 
verdicts are a function solely of moral reasons and it ignores non-moral (or self-
interested) ones.  Then it would be no surprise that morality would blame you for 
 
22 I focus on Portmore’s 2011 presentation, but his 2021: 57-61 provides the same argument that I present 
as B1-B3. 
23 Suppose B is false: suppose that you are morally blameworthy for φ-ing despite being rationally permitted 
to φ.  Since you are rationally permitted to φ, it seems that your φ-ing can be a flawless response (from the 
rational perspective) to your moral and non-moral reasons.  And yet you are still blameworthy for that 
flawless response (from the moral perspective).  This violates B3.  It seems, then, that B3 entails B. 
24 These creatures can do the act that their self-interested reasons require of them; however, they can’t do 
such acts in response to their self-interested reasons.  For example, they might survive another day, not 
because it is in their best interest, but because they can’t benefit anyone tomorrow if they don’t.  Also, 
thanks to Daniel Muñoz for the name ‘moral weirdos’. 
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something that you were rationally permitted to do.  That is, it would be no surprise that 
you could be morally blameworthy for flawlessly—from the point of view of 
rationality—responding to moral and non-moral (or self-interested) reasons.  Once we 
take the distinction between moral and rational blameworthiness seriously, it isn’t clear 
why we should endorse B1 or B2. 
 There is a grain of truth (grain of soundness?) in Portmore’s argument for B.  If we 
switch to rational blameworthiness, something in the neighborhood of B1-B3 will be 
sound.  Perhaps a certain psychopath has no capacity to respond to moral reasons.  He 
nonetheless can be rationally blameworthy for failing to respond appropriately to his self-
interested reasons.  For example, he might freely and knowledgeably choose a trivial 
immediate benefit and thereby sacrifice his long-run wellbeing.  But he can’t be rationally 
responsible for failing to respond to moral reasons, for he lacks the capacity to do so (cf. 
Portmore 2011: 48, nt 54).  So: 
B1′. S is rationally blameworthy for failing to respond correctly to moral reasons 
only if S has the capacity to respond correctly to moral reasons. 
“Surely, it cannot be that the very capacity that opens the door to an agent’s being 
blameworthy [for failing to respond correctly to moral reasons] is the one that leads her 
to perform blameworthy [failures to correctly respond to moral reasons]” (48). 
B2′. If B1′, then S can’t be rationally blameworthy for flawlessly (from the 
rational perspective) responding to moral reasons. 
Put the two premises together and you get: 
B3′. Therefore, S can’t be rationally blameworthy for flawlessly (from the rational 
perspective) responding to moral reasons. 
(I do not claim that B1′-B3′ is an equally plausible extension of Portmore’s B1-B3.  I 
claim that B1-B3 fails, whereas B1′-B3′ is plausibly sound and seems to capture the grain 
of truth in B1-B3.)   
 Yet B1′-B3′ is of no use to the moral rationalist.  Morality and rationality presumably 
agree that one can flawlessly respond to a moral reason even if you act against it.  They 
might disagree, however, about the conditions under which acting against a reason is 
flawless.  Morality might demand an opposing moral reason of at least equal weight.  
Rationality might make a less onerous demand, namely that there be some moral or non-
moral reason of at least equal weight.  Since morality and rationality might disagree about 
what counts as a flawless response to moral reasons, it shouldn’t be a surprise if one can 
be morally blameworthy without being rationally blameworthy. 
 Of course, Portmore’s account of morality contends that morality takes into account 
non-moral reasons by giving them merely justifying weight.  He will, therefore, reject the 
idea that morality blames you even when rationality doesn’t.  Yet this contention can’t 
help him here without vicious circularity.  His argument for that contention relies on 
moral rationalism as a (sub-)premise (§2).  Hence, he can’t use his contention that non-
moral reasons have merely justifying moral weight as a (sub-)premise in his argument for 
moral rationalism.  
 The second premise in Portmore’s argument for moral rationalism is B.  His argument 
for B fails.  Just as arguments for moral rationalism must be sensitive to the conceptual 
distinction between morality and rationality, such arguments must also be sensitive to the 
distinction between moral and rational blameworthiness.  Portmore’s argument for B 




4.2. An Equally Plausible Argument for Moral Rationalism about Permission 
 The best (at least from Portmore’s perspective) argument for moral rationalism about 
requirement is the Blameworthiness and Requirement Argument.  Now that we’ve seen 
why Portmore’s argument for the controversial second premise fails, it will be easy to see 
why there is an equally plausible argument for the claim that moral rationalism about 
permission is true.   
 To extend the Blameworthiness and Requirement Argument, let’s use ‘morally 
blameless’ as equivalent to ‘not morally blameworthy’.  That gives us: 
The Blameworthiness and Permission Argument 
A*. If S is morally permitted to φ, then S would be morally blameless for freely 
and knowledgeably φ-ing. 
B*. S would be morally blameless for freely and knowledgeably φ-ing only if S is 
rationally permitted to φ. 
C*. Therefore, if S is morally permitted to φ, then S is rationally permitted to φ. 
A* links moral permissions with moral blamelessness.  B* links moral blamelessness 
with rational permissions.  Together A* and B* give us C*, which is just moral 
rationalism about permission, the idea that moral permissions are also rational 
permissions. 
 If A is a conceptual truth, then A* is too.  If you do what you are morally permitted 
to do, then you’ve had a moral success.  And morality is not going to blame you for 
succeeding (cf. Skorupski 1999: 146, 150).  Consider an analogy.  Dad says to Kid, “I 
prefer that you wash my car, but it is permissible to clean up your room instead.”  Kid 
cleans his room instead.  Dad can’t sensibly blame Kid for freely and knowledgably doing 
what he was expressly permitted to do.   
 Furthermore, Portmore’s B seems committed to A*.  A* says that moral permissions 
guarantee moral blamelessness.  Portmore’s B entails that rational permissions guarantee 
moral blamelessness.25  If moral permissions don’t guarantee moral blamelessness, it is 
hard to see why rational permissions would do so.  In other words, if Portmore rejects 
A*, it makes it even harder for him to make B plausible.26 
 
25 B explicitly says that, if you are morally blameworthy for φ-ing, then you are rationally required to ~φ.  
After contraposition, B says that if you are not rationally required to ~φ, then you are morally blameless 
for φ-ing.  Now consider the antecedent ‘you are not rationally required to ~φ’.  If prohibition dilemmas 
are impossible—i.e., if it is impossible that both φ and ~φ are impermissible—then this antecedent entails 
that φ is permissible.  And Portmore’s account of reasons entails that such dilemmas are impossible.  The 
only way to get prohibition dilemmas is for there to be reasons that have more requiring weight than 
justifying weight [my forthcoming: §§4.1, 7.2].  Yet Portmore denies that such reasons are possible (2011: 
137-143).  So, in his hands, B entails that, if you are rationally permitted to φ, then you are morally 
blameless for φ-ing. 
26 A referee wonders whether that A* rules out quasi-supererogation (an action that you are praiseworthy 
for performing but blameworthy for omitting).  Maybe, but an appeal to quasi-supererogation would be at 
odds with Portmore’s approach to supererogation.  Quasi-supererogation is supposed to contrast with 
‘supererogation’ understood as an action that is praiseworthy for performing but not blameworthy for 
omitting.  Portmore explicitly disavows such approaches to supererogation: “the idea that an act is 
supererogatory is, for me, solely a deontic notion and does not depend on whether its performance is, given 
the agent’s motives and intentions, praiseworthy” (2011: 5, nt 4; cf. 97, nt. 41).  And, again, Portmore’s B 
seems committed to A* whatever A* might entail. 
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 I admit that the second premise of the argument for MRPERM, B*, is not particularly 
plausible; however, this admission doesn’t break the parity.  The best argument for B was 
a complete failure.  That’s why I tend to think that the Blameworthiness Arguments for 
moral rationalism about requirement and moral rationalism about permission are equally 
bad arguments.  With that said, there is a case to be made that they really are good 
arguments. 
 Darwall’s actual arguments for moral rationalism fail for the same reason that 
Portmore’s do.27  Yet he has the resources to accept both Blameworthiness arguments, 
both kinds of moral rationalism, and allow that Bernie is morally required to remain in 
safety.  On his view, morality is equal accountability to all members of the moral 
community, including oneself (2006: 100-4, especially 102).  Since an agent is 
accountable to oneself just as much as he is accountable to others, it is no mystery why 
Bernie’s self-interested reasons would have moral requiring weight and would make him 
morally required to remain in safety.  Of course, that’s no good for Portmore’s purposes.  
He needs a picture that vindicates moral rationalism about requirement without 
vindicating the claim that self-interested reasons have (moral) requiring weight.  
 I have provided an initial case, then, for the claim that the best argument for moral 
rationalism about requirement can be extended to an equally good (bad) argument for 
moral rationalism about permission.  Further reflection confirms this initial case. 
 Two obvious worries about the argument for MRPERM are also worries about the 
argument for MRREQ.  First, one might worry that A* is false because someone, Arthur, 
might perform a morally permitted act for morally illicit motives.  Portmore’s argument 
for B faces the same worry, and he responds that “although it is clear that Arthur is 
blameworthy, it far from clear that Arthur is blameworthy for [performing the morally 
permitted act]” (2011: 45).28   
 Second, there are plausible counterexamples to MRPERM (Harman 2016).  But there 
are also plausible counterexamples to MRREQ.  Many philosophers hold that MRREQ 
should be rejected because the correct moral theory makes unreasonable demands, i.e., 
some moral requirements are not rational requirements (e.g., Wolf 1982; Sobel 2007; 
Dorsey 2016: ch 3).  Given the conceptual nature of Portmore’s argument for MRREQ, he 
uses MRREQ as a constraint on moral theorizing.
29  Putative counterexamples to MRREQ 
 
27 Like Portmore, Darwall simply assumes that there is only one kind of blame/blameworthiness: “When 
we blame someone, we presuppose that the person we are blaming cannot adequately answer for what he 
has done [from the rational perspective]” (2016: 268; cf. 2016: 270, 2006: 98).  X’s blaming Y from a 
perspective P may presuppose both that X and Y share P and that Y violated a requirement of P (cf. 
Pufendorf’s point in Darwall 2006: 112).  Yet it does not follow that P must be the rational perspective.  If 
an eccentric billionaire pays you a $50k to stop being my friend, I might fittingly blame you for being a 
bad friend and fittingly take a range of negative reactive attitudes toward you.  I might nonetheless hold 
that you had adequate reason to do what you did (from the rational perspective).  A police officer might 
fittingly blame you and hold you legally responsible for the minor traffic violation by writing you a ticket.  
The officer might nonetheless concede that you had adequate reason to commit the minor traffic violation 
from the rational perspective.  Fitting blame is not necessarily fitting blame from the rational perspective. 
28 An alternative response would be to revise the two arguments so that they concern underived 
blameworthiness.  Suppose that, contra Portmore, blameworthiness for one’s morally illicit motives or past 
moral failures can transmit to one’s now performing a morally permissible act.  The blameworthiness for 
now acting rightly is derived from some moral failure or another.  The key intuitions behind A and A* is 
that wrong action can—and right action can’t—be an original, or underived, source of blameworthiness. 
29 Dorsey (2016: ch 2) also understands Portmore this way. 
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must be interpreted instead as counterexamples to the putatively correct moral theory.  
Yet the parallel argument for MRPERM is equally conceptual.  Thus, if MRREQ should be 
used as a constraint on moral theorizing, then MRPERM should too. 
 At the end of the day, Portmore will likely note that MRREQ seems more plausible to 
him than MRPERM.  So, here’s a challenge for him to think about as he drifts off to sleep.  
The conjunction of A* and B* entails MRPERM.  If the latter is false, then so is the former.  
I predict that however he explains why that conjunction is false, he will find an equally 
plausible explanation for why the conjunction of A and B (the premises of Portmore’s 
argument for MRREQ) is false.  If I’m right, his denial of MRPERM would commit him to 
rejecting his own strategy for defending MRREQ.
30  Since I reject both versions of moral 
rationalism and both blameworthiness arguments, I would consider that a win.31,32 
 The goal of this section was to defend the transition from Portmore’s 2 (Liv is morally 
permitted to remain in safety) to my 2* (Bernie is morally required to remain in safety).  
The only vulnerable part of Portmore’s defense of 2 is moral rationalism about 
requirement.  The only vulnerable part of my extension to 2* is moral rationalism about 
permission.  I argued that the best argument for the former moral rationalism can be 
extended into an equally good (or equally bad) argument for the latter moral rationalism.  
In short, I have shown that Portmore’s 2 and my 2* stand or fall together.  
 
5. Defending the Extension to 3*: Weighing Reasons 
5.1. Dual Scale 
 
30 Presumably, there is also some explanation of why MRREQ would be true even though MRPERM is false.  
Portmore may think he has such an explanation.  His principle, META, entails both MRREQ and ~MRPERM 
(2011: 137).  Yet Portmore’s argument for META simply assumes that MRPERM is false (2011: 139), so we 
shouldn’t take META for granted in a context in which MRPERM is up for debate. 
31 A referee worries that, since requirement is a logically stronger deontic status than permission, moral 
rationalism about requirement is correspondingly more plausible than moral rationalism about permission.  
In reply, there is nothing special about requirements or the reasons that generate requirements.  A 
requirement to φ is just the combined deontic verdict that φ is permissible and ~φ is impermissible.  To 
anticipate the model in the next section, permissions to φ are the result of a single competition between the 
justifying weight for φ (JWφ) and requiring weight for ~φ (RW~φ).  Requirements to φ are the result of this 
same competition and an additional competition which determines the (im)permissibility of ~φ, namely 
JW~φ vs RWφ.  I don’t see why this difference gives us much, if any, reason to expect that moral 
requirements have a greater connection to rational statuses than moral permissions do.   
32 A referee wonders: if moral rationalism about requirement and permission stand or fall together, does it 
follow that moral rationalism about requirement also stands or falls with any other normatively significant 
status (e.g., every morally best action is rationally best)?  No.  Portmore’s argument for moral rationalism 
is driven by intuitions about when actions are blameworthy.  Whether an action is required or permissible 
seems to have a tighter connection to when actions are blameworthy than whether an action is morally best.  
You aren’t morally blameworthy for freely and knowledgeably failing to do the morally best action when 
it is merely supererogatory; however, you may be morally blameworthy for freely and knowledgably 
performing an impermissible action or an action that you were required not to do.  Furthermore, permissions 
and requirements are functions of the competition between justifying and requiring weight.  Some other 
normatively significant statuses are not (merely) functions of justifying and requiring weight.  For example, 
Portmore’s account of morally best appeals to a third feature of reasons (recall note 10 above).  
Consequently, it is less surprising if moral rationalism about requirement and permission stand or fall 
together than that moral rationalism about requirement and bestness stand or fall together. 
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 In this section, I argue that 3 entails 3*.  3 and 3* are 
principles concerning how to weigh reasons against one 
another in order to determine a deontic verdict.  It is 
tempting to think that reasons must be weighed on a 
“single scale” (cf. Curtis 1981: 31).  The reasons for φ, 
Rφ, go in one pan and the reasons against φ, R~φ, go in the 
other.  φ is permissible iff the reasons against φ are not 
weightier than the reasons for φ.  Such a view is simple 
and popular, but it cannot be Portmore’s. 
 Portmore’s account of supererogation depends on the assumption that different kinds 
of reasons (altruistic vs self-interested) have different proportions of justifying and 
requiring weight.  Such an assumption is incompatible with the single scale model of 
weighing reasons (Gert 2004: ch 5; 2007; Tucker forthcoming: §3-5).  The problem isn’t 
with the image of the scale, but the image of a single scale. 
 Like the single scale model, Dual Scale holds that the deontic status of an action is 
determined by the relative weights of the reasons for and against it.  But it holds that, to 
fully capture the two different weights (justifying vs requiring), we must appeal to two 
scales.  Permission Scale determines whether an act is permissible: φ is permissible iff 
the justifying weight for φ (JWφ) is at least as weighty as the requiring weight against φ 
(RW~φ).   
 We should introduce one more term, so that we can understand my name for the 
second scale.  If your only goal in life is to eat every rock that you find, I might hold up 
a rock and remark that your aim commits you to eating this rock.  In this sense of 
commitment, φ is a commitment iff ~φ is impermissible.  If you can be committed to 
eating this rock without it being permissible to do so, then you are in what is often called 
a prohibition dilemma (both φ and ~φ are impermissible).  But set such things aside.  More 
relevant to this paper is that φ is required iff φ is both permissible and a commitment (i.e., 
~φ is impermissible). 
 Commitment Scale determines whether the act is a commitment (whether the 
alternative is impermissible): φ is a 
commitment iff the requiring weight 
for φ (RWφ) is weightier than the 
justifying weight against it (JW~φ).  
The two scales work together to 
determine whether φ is required.  An 
act is required just when Permission 
Scale says that φ is permissible and 
Commitment Scale says that ~φ is 
impermissible.   
 Dual Scale is a model for how 
reasons are to be weighed.  It does not 
itself come with a view about the weights of various kinds of reasons.  
 Elsewhere I develop and defend this model at length (forthcoming, 2022, manuscript).  
Here I work with a simplified version.  In the rest of this sub-section, I use the Liv and 
Bernie cases to illustrate how the model works.  In the next sub-section, I show that, given 
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three assumptions, Portmore’s 3 commits Portmore to both 3* of the extension and Dual 
Scale. 
 Liv must choose whether to jump on the grenade to save five soldiers (Sacrifice) or 
remain in safety (Safety).  The standard otherist account supposes that the lives of the 
five soldiers have both justifying and requiring weight (say, 500 JWSacrifice and 500 
RWSacrifice).  The account treats self-interested reasons, such as the value of Liv’s life, as 
weighty merely justifying reasons (say, 1,000 JWSafety and 0 RWSafety).  Permission Scale 
entails that Sacrifice is permissible, because the justifying weight of Liv’s altruistic 
reason is weightier than the non-existent requiring weight of her self-interested reason 
(500 JWSacrifice > 0 RWSafety).  Commitment Scale entails that the Sacrifice isn’t a 
commitment, because the requiring weight of the altruistic reason is outweighed by the 
justifying weight of her self-interested reason (500 RWSacrifice < 1,000 JWSafety). 
 
(deontic status of Liv’s Sacrifice, assuming standard account of supererogation) 
Permission Scale Commitment Scale 
500 JWSacrifice 0 RWSafety 500 RWSacrifice 1,000 JWSafety 
Verdict: Sacrifice is permissible Verdict: Sacrifice is not a commitment 
Combined verdict: Sacrifice is permissible but not required 
 
Since the altruistic act is permissible but not a commitment (and so not required), one 
goes beyond the call of duty in performing it.  At least, one goes beyond the call on the 
plausible assumption that it is morally better to save the five soldiers than to save one’s 
own life. 
 Bernie must choose whether to jump on the grenade to spare a soldier from a mild 
burn (Sacrifice) or remain in (Safety).  Let’s suppose that the prevention of a mild burn 
has 1 unit of justifying and requiring weight (1 JWSacrifice and 1 RWSacrifice).  A minor 
change to the standard otherist account will allow us to make sense of Bernie’s being 
morally required to remain in safety.  Let’s say that self-interested reasons have 100 times 
less requiring than justifying weight.  In the Liv case, we assumed that the agent’s life 
had 1,000 justifying weight for Safety.  So that means Bernie’s life has a measly 10 
requiring weight for Safety; however, that measly amount is enough to make Bernie 
required to remain in safety.  Permission Scale holds that Sacrifice is impermissible (1 
JWSacrifice < 10 RWSafety).  Commitment Scale says that Sacrifice is not a commitment (1 
RWSacrifice < 1,000 JWSafety).  Thus, Sacrifice is neither permissible nor a commitment.  
Bernie is, in other words, morally required to remain in safety.33 
 
(deontic status of Bernie’s Sacrifice, assuming a slight modification to standard account 
of supererogation) 
Permission Scale Commitment Scale 
1 JWSacrifice 10 RWSafety 1 RWSacrifice 1,000 JWSafety 
Verdict: Sacrifice is impermissible Verdict: Sacrifice is not a commitment 
Combined verdict: required to not Sacrifice 
 
33 Recall that φ is a commitment iff ~φ is impermissible.  Since Sacrifice is not a commitment, then Safety 
is permissible.  Since Sacrifice is impermissible, then Safety is a commitment.  So Safety is a permissible 





5.2. From 3 to Both 3* and Dual Scale 
 Now that we understand Dual Scale, I will rely on three assumptions and Portmore’s 
3 to establish both 3* and Dual Scale.  The details are tedious.  If you are willing to 
assume that Dual Scale is true, then defending the transition from 3 to 3* is easy: the 
Permission Scale vindicates Portmore’s 3 (Portmore’s 3 is essentially the “only if” part 
of the Permission Scale) and the Commitment Scale vindicates the extension’s 3* (3* is 
essentially the “only if” part of Commitment Scale).  If you are satisfied, then feel free to 
skip to §6.  If you don’t want to assume that Dual Scale is true, then you’ll have to wade 
through the tedium (sorry!). 
 Recall: 
3. If an agent has some moral requiring reason, MRR, for φ but is permitted to 
~φ (and so is not all-in required to φ), then there is a reason with at least as 
much justifying weight for ~φ as MRR has moral requiring weight for φ. 
3 entails that ~φ is permissible only if JW~φ ≥ RWφ.  My first assumption is one that 
Portmore seems to make, namely (Sufficiency) ~φ is permissible if JW~φ ≥ RWφ.
34  The 
conjunction of Portmore’s 3 (the “only if” part) and Sufficiency (the “if” part) gives us 
the full: 
Permission Scale: φ is permissible iff JWφ ≥ RW~φ.   
 Permission Scale entails Commitment Scale.  The picture of Dual Scale from §5.1 
illustrates this.  Notice that Commitment Scale is just the mirror image of Permission 
Scale after swapping φ and ~φ.  For example, after you swap φ and ~φ, the left side of 
Permission Scale is the right side of Commitment Scale.  This shouldn’t be surprising.  
Permission Scale models whether φ is permissible.  Commitment Scale models whether 
the alternative is impermissible (aka, whether φ is a commitment).  Put the two models 
together, and you model whether φ is required.  To verify that Permission Scale entails 
Commitment Scale, we just need to clarify the relationship between assignments of 
permissibility of φ and impermissibility of ~φ. 
 My second assumption is: 
No Overlap: no act is both (morally) permissible and impermissible.35 
Given (the “if” part of) Permission Scale and No Overlap, it follows that φ is 
impermissible only if JWφ < RW~φ.  My third and final assumption is: 
No Gaps: every act is (morally) permissible or impermissible. 
 
34 Quibbling about whether “≥” is the right place to draw the line for permissibility won’t be productive.  
As long as there is some amount of net justifying weight (JWφ – RW~φ) that is sufficient for the 
permissibility of φ, 3 will entail a version of 3* that works for my purposes.  It seems hard to deny that φ 
is permissible when the justifying weight for it outweighs the requiring weight against it by a wide margin.  
Given that a mild burn has very little requiring weight, I can weaken (ii*) to: the requiring weight for ~φ is 
not, by a wide margin, outweighed by MJR’s justifying weight.  I would then just need to make the 
corresponding changes to the assignment rules for Permission and Commitment Scales. 
35 Do not confuse No Overlap with No (Prohibition) Dilemma: there is never a case in which both it is 
impermissible to φ and impermissible to ~φ.  I allow for the conceptual possibility of dilemmas, which 
partly explains why I distinguish between commitment and requirement.  Yet I do not allow for the 
conceptual possibility that the same act is all-in both permissible and impermissible (see my manuscript for 
a partial defense of this claim). 
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Given (the “only if” part of) Permission Scale and No Gaps, it follows that that φ is 
impermissible if JWφ < RW~φ.  Put these new “if” and “only if” parts together, and we 
get the intermediate Impermissibility Rule: φ is impermissible iff JWφ < RW~φ.  To get 
Commitment Scale, just apply the Impermissibility Rule to ~φ: ~φ is impermissible (aka 
φ is a commitment) iff JW~φ < RWφ (equivalently: RWφ > JW~φ).  And then we have: 
Commitment Scale: φ is a commitment (the alternative is impermissible) iff the 
RWφ > JW~φ.   
 So far, I’ve shown that once Portmore endorses 3 (and my three assumptions), he is 
stuck with Dual Scale whether he likes it or not.  And once he’s stuck with Dual Scale, 
he is stuck with 3* too.  3* is essentially the “only if” part of the Commitment Scale.  
Recall: 
3*. If an agent has a moral justifying reason, MJR, for φ but is not all-in morally 
permitted to φ, then there is a reason with more moral requiring weight for ~φ 
than MJR has justifying weight for φ. 
3* says that φ is impermissible (~φ is a commitment) only if RW~φ > JWφ.  When we are 
evaluating the deontic status of ~φ, Commitment Scale tells us the same thing, that φ is 
impermissible (aka: ~φ is a commitment) only if RW~φ > JWφ.  In short, I have argued 
that endorsing 3 commits one to endorsing 3*, as well as the Dual Scale model of 
weighing reasons. 
 
6. Portmore’s Last Chance 
 Portmore assumed 4 (Liv’s self-interested reason is the only candidate to explain 
Liv’s moral permission to remain in safety).  My extension assumed 4* (Bernie’s self-
interested reason is the only candidate to explain his moral requirement to remain in 
safety).  Portmore’s last chance to break the parallel is for his assumption to be more 
plausible than mine.  But it isn’t. 
 
6.1. An Objection to Both 4 and 4* 
 Standard otherists deny that self-interest has moral requiring weight, but they don’t 
necessarily deny that agents have moral duties to themselves.  Thus, they might concede 
that Bernie is morally required to remain in safety but then find some reason besides self-
interest to explain this moral requirement.  The following reasons are distinct from 
Bernie’s self-interest and yet are candidates to explain his moral requirement to remain 
in safety: 
Autonomy: Bernie has moral requiring weight to prevent the destruction of his 
rational autonomy, which would result from his death (Schofield 2019: 228). 
Talents: Bernie has moral requiring weight to develop his worthwhile talents 
(Portmore 129).  Chances are that his death would prevent at least one 
worthwhile talent from being sufficiently developed.  
Promises: Promises to oneself have moral requiring weight, at least until we let 
ourselves off the hook (Rosati 2011).  Given that certain goals or career 
aspirations may involve making promises to oneself, it is plausible that Bernie’s 
death would break some promise to himself. 
Hence, 4* is false.  There are other candidates besides Bernie’s self-interested reasons to 
explain why he is morally required to remain in safety. 
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 Nonetheless, the parallel between Portmore’s argument and the extension remains 
intact.  4 is also false.  There are other candidates to explain Liv’s permission to remain 
in safety, such as altruistic but partial reasons.  Liv’s death will harm those beloved who 
love her, especially any dependents, and it is widely held that we have very weighty 
reasons to promote the interests of our beloved. 
 The Liv case is mine, but 4 is also false for Portmore’s Fiona case (125).  Fiona can 
use her savings self-interestedly (as the down payment that finalizes her home purchase) 
or altruistically (as a donation to Oxfam).  Fiona is morally permitted to forgo the vastly 
more beneficial Oxfam donation, but her self-interest is not the only candidate to explain 
her moral permission.  If Fiona doesn’t complete the home purchase, she presumably 
breaks significant promises and harms people, such as the owners of the house she 
promised to buy and the realtors who don’t get paid.  These harms to others are especially 
weighty because she would be causing rather than merely allowing them. 
 The above objections to 4 and 4* win the battle but lose the war.  They win the battle, 
because they show that in the single Liv (Fiona) and Bernie cases at hand there is another 
candidate explanation.  They lose the war, because 4 and 4* are probably true for some 
Liv and Bernie case or another.  In the rest of the section, I defend a general strategy for 
defending 4* and explain why you can’t reject that general strategy without rejecting 
Portmore’s 4.   
 
6.2. Why the Extension Wins the War 
 Consider what happens if we gradually decrease the cost of jumping on the grenade.  
We notice a corresponding decrease in how much moral requiring weight there is to 
remain in safety.  There is less moral requiring weight when Bernie is just paralyzed from 
the neck down and less still when he just loses his non-dominant hand.  Eventually, we 
reach a point at which he is no longer required to remain in safety, holding fixed that the 
only benefit to jumping on the grenade is preventing the mild burn.36  In other words: 
Requiring Weight Correlation: the weight of Bernie’s self-interested reasons is 
systematically correlated with the moral requiring weight that he has to remain 
in safety. 
The extension’s conclusion—that self-interested reasons have moral requiring weight—
if true, provides a simple, straightforward explanation of Requiring Weight Correlation.  
Unless a potential alternative explains the Requiring Weight Correlation or at least 
covaries with Bernie’s self-interested reasons, it will fail to explain Bernie’s moral 
permission in some version of the Bernie case. 
 For example, consider reasons to protect one’s autonomy, reasons to develop one’s 
talents, and reasons to keep promises to oneself.  They neither explain Requiring Weight 
Correlation, nor covary with self-interested reasons.  There is, therefore, some version of 
the Bernie case in which these alternatives are not candidate explanations.  Simply revise 
the Bernie case as follows: jumping on the grenade will not kill Bernie, but will paralyze 
him from the waist down; Bernie has a unique but undeveloped talent for musical 
composition, one worth developing at the expense of any other talent he might have (cf. 
Portmore 129); and he has made no promises to himself about the future, except perhaps 
that he will try to be more altruistic.   
 
36 I also leave it open that, after a certain point, self-interested reasons are sufficiently weak that they no 
longer have moral requiring weight at all. 
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 In this revised case, Bernie is still rationally required to remain in safety.  It is foolish 
to endure lifelong paralysis for the sake of preventing someone else’s mild burn.  Thanks 
to moral rationalism about permission and Dual Scale (or 3*), it follows that Bernie is 
morally required to remain in safety and these self-interested reasons suffice for (some 
reason that has) moral requiring weight.  Now, however, the only candidate to explain his 
moral requirement to remain in safety are those very self-interested reasons.  In the 
revised case, jumping on the grenade is no obstacle to preserving his rational autonomy, 
developing his talents, or keeping promises to himself. 
 Perhaps I’ve missed some other candidate explanation.  But don’t get tunnel vision.  
Don’t forget that an alternative needs to do more than explain Bernie’s moral requirement 
in the above two versions of the Bernie case.  My revisions to the Bernie case were an 
instance of: 
General Strategy*: modify the Bernie case so that (i) the alleged alternative is not 
a candidate to explain Bernie’s moral requirement to remain in safety, and (ii) 
the greater self-interested benefits make it rationally impermissible to secure the 
smaller altruistic benefits. 
The resulting Bernie case, when combined with moral rationalism about permission and 
Dual Scale (or 3*), underwrites the extension.  To block the extension’s conclusion (while 
endorsing 1*-3*), you’ll need an alternative that blocks General Strategy*.  To block 
General Strategy*, you’ll need an alternative that explains Requiring Weight Correlation 
or covaries with self-interested reasons.  (Portmore’s 4 is false in the original Liv case, 
but he can defend 4 with a parallel strategy.37) 
 If General Strategy* fails, then Portmore’s 4 is false.  Bernie’s moral requiring weight 
to remain in safety systematically covaries with the weight of his self-interested reasons.  
So, to block General Strategy*, you need an alternative that has both moral requiring 
weight and systematically covaries with the weight of his self-interested reasons.  
Suppose there is one.  Call it Alt.  Since Alt co-varies with self-interest, it will be present 
not only in all Bernie cases, but also in all Liv cases.  Portmore does not allow requiring 
weight to outstrip justifying weight (2011: 137-143).  Hence, Alt would have justifying 
weight too, and therefore would be an alternative to self-interest’s having justifying 
weight.  In short, any alternative that makes the extension’s 4* false for every Bernie case 
will make Portmore’s 4 false for every Liv case.  4 and 4* stand or fall together. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this paper, I brought together three neglected topics: going too far beyond the call 
of duty, moral rationalism about permission, and how to weigh reasons when some 
reasons have a different proportion of justifying and requiring weight than others.  I 
brought them together to challenge the standard otherist account of supererogation, as 
championed by Portmore.   
 If self-interest isn’t a moral reason, as the otherist contends, it is initially unclear how 
the otherist can make sense of supererogation’s optionality.  By relying on moral 
 
37 Since self-interested reasons are also systematically correlated with justifying weight (cf. Portmore 2011: 
126), Portmore can defend 4 using: 
General Strategy: modify the Liv case so that (i) the alleged alternative is not a candidate to 
explain Liv’s moral permission to remain in safety, and yet (ii) the smaller self-interested 
benefits make it rationally permissible to forgo the larger potential altruistic benefits. 
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rationalism about requirements, Portmore argues that self-interested reasons have moral 
justifying weight, even though they are non-moral reasons.  He assumes that if self-
interested reasons had moral requiring weight, they would be moral reasons, which would 
be tantamount to giving up on otherism.  And thus Portmore will balk at the idea that 
Bernie’s self-interested reasons have moral requiring weight.   
 I have argued, however, that Portmore’s position is unstable.  Portmore’s argument 
that self-interested reasons have moral justifying weight can be extended to show that 
they also have moral requiring weight.  Consequently, Portmore and like-minded otherists 
must give up the moral rationalism that motivates their account of supererogation’s 
optionality or they must concede both that Bernie’s self-interested reason has moral 
requiring weight and that Bernie is morally required to remain in safety.  In short, I have 
shown that Portmore must choose between two things near and dear to his heart: his moral 
rationalism and his otherism.38   
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